On non-existent o-days, stable binary exploits and user interaction

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GOAL

NEED SOME 0-DAY REMOTE EXPLOITS* FOR TOP SOFTWARE/OS, FAST

How they do it

- Target memory corruption
- X% fuzzing + Y% static analysis
 - Only combination is viable
 - Other approaches are inmature
- Fuzzing: massive overhead
 - Set up a framework
 - Develop patterns/heuristics !!
 - Take machine time
 - Analyze crash dumps!
 - Exploit, bypass DEP/ASLR/Sandbox !!!
- Perspective
 - protections harden
 - need more and more time to succeed
 - and resources to begin with

Perspective vectors

- By-design vulnerabilities
 - E.g. DLL Hijacking, UI redressing,
 LD LIBRARY PATH...
- Sandbox bypass for complex systems
 - E.g. JAVA: bypass SecurityManager -> full privileges for unsigned applet -> win
- Certificates
 - E.g. Adobe PDF: signed document -> trusted document -> full-privileged JavaScript -> win

Why DLL Hijacking?

- Test hacking skills!
 - Succeed with a blind alley before hitting the highway
- Looks easy
 - Plenty of previous research, e.g. binaryplanting.com
 - Interns must do research, too
- Real world targetted attacks: CVE-2011-1980, CVE-2011-1991, CVE-2011-2100
 - They work
- MS12-046 vbe6.dll
 - They still exist!
- OS behaviour undocumented
 - There is place for research

Research focus

- Top, clean platforms
 - Windows 7
 - Windows XP
 - Office 2010
 - Office 2007
 - Adobe Acrobat/Reader
- Find a new remote delivery vector
 - Not a ".dll" in e-mail attachment
 - Not a ".dll" in a network share
- Find something yet unfound

Tech recap

- Exe -> dll by relative path
- DLL Search Order
- Current Directory (CD) MS DOS rudiment
- Default: app path
- File open: file path
- Some other changes
- Exploitation profit: Bypass restrictions, LPE,
 RCE
- Vectors: local, local network, client-side

Advantages

- 100% stable exploit
- 100% silent execution on non-supported targets
- Very little overhead
- No mess with protections
- ! Not fixable globally with simple measures like DEP/ASLR
 - Only developers education can help
 - Will reappear in new software forever

Challenges

- Search
 - "Trivial => already found" myth
- Exploitation
 - Nobody ever tried to manipulate CD
- User interaction
 - Triggered by clicking menus... now what?
- Masking / delivery
 - Document + DLL binding looks suspicious

Arguing myths

NONEXISTENT?

7500+ missing Windows DLLs

	A	В
1	Название DLL	ОС, в которых отсутствует
449	avmenum.dll	Windows 8, Server 2012, WindowsXP, Server 2003
450	avmeter.dll	Server 2008, Win Vista, Server 2012, Windows 7, Windows 8, Server 2003
451	avolprop.dll	WindowsXP, Windows 8, Win Vista, Windows 7, Server 2003
452	avrt.dll	WindowsXP, Server 2003
453	avtapi.dll	Server 2008, Windows 7, Server 2012, Win Vista, Windows 8, Server 2003
454	avwav.dll	Win Vista, Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows 8, Server 2003, Server 2012
455	axaltocm.dll	Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows XP, Server 2003, Server 2012
456	AxInstSv.dll	Server 2003, WindowsXP, Server 2008
457	AzRLPia.dll	Windows 8, Win Vista, WindowsXP, Server 2012, Windows 7, Server 2008
458	azrlpia2.dll	Windows 8, Windows 7, Server 2012, Win Vista, Server 2008, WindowsXP
459	azroleui.dll	WindowsXP
460	AzSqlExt.dll	WindowsXP, Server 2003
461	backsnap.dll	Win Vista, Windows 8, WindowsXP, Server 2012, Windows 7, Server 2008
462	basebrd.dll	Server 2003, WindowsXP
463	basecsp.dll	Server 2003, WindowsXP
464	BatchParser.dll	Win Vista, Server 2003, Windows 7, Server 2008, Windows 8, WindowsXP
465	batt.dll	Windows 8, Server 2012
466	bcdeditai.dll	Win Vista, Server 2008, Windows 7, Server 2003, WindowsXP
467	bcdprov.dll	WindowsXP, Server 2003

20+ Mb filtered log per app

Time of Day Process Name	PID Operation	Path	Result
14:57:11,2682566 💽 EXCEL.EXE	3836 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 10.0\PDFMaker	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:11,2751617 💽 EXCEL.EXE	3836 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office12\MPS.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:11,2753342 🔯 EXCEL.EXE	3836 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\MPS.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:11,2756400 💽 EXCEL.EXE	3836 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Windows\system\MPS.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:11,2757756 💽 EXCEL.EXE	3836 氎 CreateFile	C:\Windows\MPS.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:11,2759052 💽 EXCEL.EXE	3836 氎 CreateFile	C:\Users\daemon\Desktop\MPS.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:11,2760329 💽 EXCEL.EXE	3836 氎 CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 10.0\PDFMaker	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:11,3007070 🚺 acrotray.exe	244 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 10.0\Acrobat\nt	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:13,4089440 💽 EXCEL.EXE	3836 氎 CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office12\ATMLI	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:15,4962153 🚺 acrotray.exe	244 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 10.0\Acrobat\pr	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:15,6574357 🚺 acrotray.exe	244 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wbemcomn.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:15,6670424 🚺 acrotray.exe	244 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 10.0\Acrobat\C	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:15,6769404 🚺 acrotray.exe	244 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 10.0\Acrobat\R	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:15,6990090 🚺 acrotray.exe	244 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\wbem\NTDSAPI.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:15,8030169 🗂 wmiprvse.exe	768 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wbemcomn.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:15,8198506 🗂 wmiprvse.exe	768 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\wbem\NTDSAPI.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:15,8267253 🗂 wmiprvse.exe	768 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\wbem\NC0bjAPI.DLL	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:15,8913089 🗂 wmiprvse.exe	768 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\wbem\CRYPTBASE.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:15,8922964 🗂 wmiprvse.exe	768 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\wbem\ntmarta.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:15,9067852 🗂 wmiprvse.exe	768 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\wbem\CRYPTSP.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:15,9154699 🗂 wmiprvse.exe	768 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\wbem\RpcRtRemote.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:15,9626356 🗂 wmiprvse.exe	768 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\wbem\framedynos.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:16,0462638 🗂 wmiprvse.exe	768 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\wbem\SspiCli.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:16,0470821 🗂 wmiprvse.exe	768 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WTSAPI32.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:16,3674810 🗂 wmiprvse.exe	768 🛃 CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WMI.DLL	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:17,0191646 🗂 csrss.exe	348 🔜 CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 10.0\Acrobat\Ad.	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:17,0246286 🛴Acrobat.exe	2568 🔜 CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 10.0\Acrobat\V	NAME NOT FOUND
14:57:17,0562178 🔼 Acrobat.exe	2568 🔜 CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 10.0\Acrobat\C	NAME NOT FOUND
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Arguing myths

NOT EXPLOITABLE?

Good!

Time of Day Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result
1:54:23,2735941 OUTLOOK.EXE	3288	QueryOpen	D:_TEST_\imageres.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
1:54:35,0773821 🚺 OUTLOOK.EXE	3288	🔜 QueryOpen 👚	D:_TEST_\cryptui.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
1:54:45,8151853 🛍mpc-hc.exe	3044	🔜 QueryOpen 👚	D:_TEST_\xvidcore.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
1:54:45,8161857 🚮mpc-hc.exe		🔜 QueryOpen 👚	D:_TEST_\xvidcore.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
1:54:45,8182477 🚮mpc-hc.exe		🔜 QueryOpen 👚	$D:\TEST_\avisynth.dll$	NAME NOT FOUND
1:54:45,8188166 🚮mpc-hc.exe		🔜 QueryOpen 👚	D:_TEST_\avisynth.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
1:54:45,8217443 🛍 mpc-hc.exe		🔜 QueryOpen 👚	D:_TEST_\ff_liba52.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
1:54:45,8224413 🚮mpc-hc.exe	3044	🔜 QueryOpen 👚	D:_TEST_\ff_liba52.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
1:54:45,8251856 🛍 mpc-hc.exe	3044	🔜 QueryOpen 👚	D:_TEST_\IntelQuickSyn	NAME NOT FOUND
1:54:45,8259004 🛍 mpc-hc.exe	3044	🔜 QueryOpen 👚	D:_TEST_\IntelQuickSyn	NAME NOT FOUND
1:54:45,9473821 🚮mpc-hc.exe		🔜 QueryOpen 👚	D:_TEST_\xvidcore.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
1:54:45,9481133 🚮mpc-hc.exe		🔜 QueryOpen 👚	D:_TEST_\xvidcore.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
1:54:45,9510509 🚮mpc-hc.exe		🔜 QueryOpen 👚	$D:\TEST_\avisynth.dll$	NAME NOT FOUND
1:54:45,9517870 🚮mpc-hc.exe	3044	🔜 QueryOpen 👚	D:_TEST_\avisynth.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
1:54:45,9550430 🛍 mpc-hc.exe	3044	🔜 QueryOpen 👚	D:_TEST_\ff_liba52.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
1:54:45,9558464 🚮mpc-hc.exe	3044	NueryOpen 💮	D:_TEST_\ff_liba52.dll	NAME NOT FOUND

Not so good

14:57:11,2756400 EXCEL.EXE 3836 CreateFile C:\Windows\system\MPS.dll NAME N 14:57:11,2759052 EXCEL.EXE 3836 CreateFile C:\Windows\MPS.dll NAME N 14:57:11,2759052 EXCEL.EXE 3836 CreateFile C:\Windows\MPS.dll NAME N 14:57:11,3007070 Carotray.exe 244 CreateFile C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 10.0\Acrobat\nt NAME N 14:57:13,4089440 EXCEL.EXE 3836 CreateFile C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 10.0\Acrobat\nt NAME N 14:57:15,4962153 Cacrotray.exe 244 CreateFile C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 10.0\Acrobat\nt NAME N 14:57:15,6670424 Cacrotray.exe 244 CreateFile C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wbemcomn.dll NAME N 14:57:15,6670424 Cacrotray.exe 244 CreateFile C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wbemcomt.dll NAME N 14:57:15,66990090 Cacrotray.exe 244 CreateFile C:\Windows\System32\wbem\NTDSAPI.dll NAME N 14:57:15,8930169 Wmipryse.exe 768 CreateFile C:\Windows\System32\wbem\NTDSAPI.dll NAME N	
14:57:11,2753342 EXCEL.EXE 3836 CreateFile C:\Windows\System32\MPS.dll NAME N 14:57:11,2756400 EXCEL.EXE 3836 CreateFile C:\Windows\system\MPS.dll NAME N 14:57:11,2757756 EXCEL.EXE 3836 CreateFile C:\Windows\MPS.dll NAME N 14:57:11,2759052 EXCEL.EXE 3836 CreateFile C:\Users\daemon\Desktop\MPS.dll NAME N 14:57:11,3007070 Cacrotray.exe 244 CreateFile C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 10.0\Acrobat\nt NAME N 14:57:15,4962153 Cacrotray.exe 244 CreateFile C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 10.0\Acrobat\nt NAME N 14:57:15,6670424 Cacrotray.exe 244 CreateFile C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wbemcomn.dll NAME N 14:57:15,6769404 Cacrotray.exe 244 CreateFile C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wbem\wbemcomn.dll NAME N 14:57:15,89303069 Cacrotray.exe 244 CreateFile C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wbem\wbemcomn.dll NAME N 14:57:15,89303069 Cacrotray.exe 244 CreateFile C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wbem\wbemcomn.dll <t< td=""><td>OT FOUND</td></t<>	OT FOUND
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14:57:15,8267253 wmiprvse.exe 768 CreateFile C:\Windows\System32\wbem\NC0bjAPI.DLL NAME N 14:57:15,8913089 wmiprvse.exe 768 CreateFile C:\Windows\System32\wbem\CRYPTBASE.dll NAME N 14:57:15,8922964 wmiprvse.exe 768 CreateFile C:\Windows\System32\wbem\ntmarta.dll NAME N	OT FOUND
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– 14:57:17,0191646 🗂 csrss.exe — 348 🛃 CreateFile — C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 10.0\Acrobat\Ad…NAME N	
– 14:57:17,0246286 💹 Acrobat.exe — 2568 🛃 CreateFile — C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 10.0\Acrobat\V NAME N	OT FOUND
14:57:17,0562178 Acrobat.exe 2568 CreateFile C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 10.0\Acrobat\C NAME N	OT FOUND

Goal: manipulate CD

If SafeDilSearchMode is enabled, the search order is as follows:

- The directory from which the application loaded.
- The system rectory. Use the GetSystemDirectory function to get the pat
- 3. The 16-bit stem directory. There is no function that obtains the path of the
- The Wind structure of directory. Use the GetWindowsDirectory function to get the
- The current directory.
- The directories that are listed in the PATH environment variable. Note that Paths registry key. The App Paths key is not used when computing the DI

If Safe DisearchMode is disabled, the search order is as follows:

- The ectory from which the application loaded.
- The current directory.
- 3. The system directory. Use the GetSystemDirectory function to get the pat
- The 16-bit system directory. There is no function that obtains the path of th
- The Windows directory. Use the GetWindowsDirectory function to get the
- The directories that are listed in the PATH environment variable. Note that Paths registry key. The App Paths key is not used when computing the DI

CD internals

```
0:005> dt PEB @$peb -r
ntdll! PEB
 +0x010 ProcessParameters: 0x00020000 RTL USER PROCESS PARAMETERS
   +0x024 CurrentDirectory: CURDIR
    +0x000 DosPath : UNICODE STRING "C:\Documents and Settings\h\My Documents\"
                      : 0x00000b50 Void
    +0x008 Handle
// получение адреса CurrentDirectory (первый dword - размеры, второй – указатель на строку)
0:005> dd poi(@$peb+0x010)+0x024
00020024 02080052 00020290 00000b50 01840182
00020034 00020498 006e006c 0002061c 00740072
// проверка адреса CD
0:005> du 0x20290
00020290 "C:\Documents and Settings\h\My D"
000202d0 "ocuments\"
// точка останова
0:005> ba w 4 0x20290
```

CD internals - 2

- MSDN: "it is the directory in which the active application started, unless it has been explicitly changed" actually no
- Way of starting an app affects CD
 - App exec default: app dir
 - App exec: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths
 - Exec by lnk: lnk dir
 - Document open: document dir
 - CreateProcess(): IpCurrentDirectory
- CD set internally by some API
 - GetOpenFileName() / GetSaveFileName()
 - FindFirstFile() / FindNextFile() (presumably)
- Many file system APIs depend on CD
 - So developers call SetCurrentDirectory() every now and then

So...?

1984	CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\rapi.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
1984	🔜 CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\rapi.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
	🔜 CreateFile	C:\Windows\system\rapi.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
	🛃 CreateFile	C:\Windows\rapi.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
	🛃 CreateFile 🕒	C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\rapi.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
	🛃 CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 10.0\PDFMaker\Office\rapi.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
	🛃 CreateFile 📗	C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 10.0\Acrobat\rapi.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
	🛃 CreateFile 🕒	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\rapi.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
	🛃 CreateFile 📗	C:\Windows\System32\rapi.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
	🛃 CreateFile 👚	C:\Windows\rapi.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
	🛃 CreateFile 📗	C:\Windows\System32\wbem\rapi.dll	NAME NOT FOUND
1984	🛃 CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\rapi.dll	NAME NOT FOUND

Local exploitation

- Bypass restrictions/LPE: place exploit DLL into unrestricted location
- Consider %PATH%

PATH FTW

1

I experience a very strange problem. I have the following path variable.

%SystemRoot%\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\;C:\Python27\;C:\Python27\Scripts;C: \Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\Windows Live;C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\Windows Live; C:\Windows\system32; C:\Windows; C:\Windows\System32\Wbem; C:\Windows\System32\W indowsPowerShell\v1.0\;C:\Program Files (x86)\Lenovo\Access Connections\;C:\Program Files\ThinkPad\Bluetooth Software\;C:\Program Files\ThinkPad\Bluetooth Software\syswow64;C:\SWTOOLS\ReadyApps;C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Live\Shared;C:\Program Files (x86)\GTK2-Runtime\bin;C:\Program Files\Intel\WiFi\bin\;C:\Program Files\Common Files\Intel\WirelessCommon\;C:\Users\Robert\AppData\Roaming\Python\Scripts;C:\Wind ows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\;C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\Windows Live;C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\Windows Live; C:\Windows\system32; C:\Windows; C:\Windows\System32\Wbem; C:\Windows\System32\W indowsPowerShell\v1.0\;C:\Program Files (x86)\Lenovo\Access Connections\;C:\Program Files\ThinkPad\Bluetooth Software\;C:\Program Files\ThinkPad\Bluetooth Software\syswow64;C:\SWTOOLS\ReadyApps;C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Live\Shared;C:\Program Files (x86)\GTK2-Runtime\bin;C:\Program Files\Intel\WiFi\bin\;C:\Program Files\Common

Remote exploitation

- Just open a document (the lucky case)
- Make user Open/Save/Import/Export files, then trigger
- Or automate file operations with a script
- Induce an app state with CD changed by developer
- Set CD explicitly
- Find an app that CreateProcess()-es vulnerable app with good CD

Arguing myths

EXPLOIT DLL TOO OBVIOUS?


No hiding

The PDF was detected on April 13 in a 7z archive, which included


- 1) 2 clean pdfs (have some info about the victim and not included for the
- oleacc.dll Size: 32768 MD5: BADD488212891EBC1D76BE901E70D4A1
- Speaker information1.pdf Size: 12253 MD5: 7EA84B62DA84DCD8B6F577D6
- 4) Thumbs.db 34816 bytes 2898107be3c4ac71cd16898b6a08fe87

Name A	Size	Type
Agenda.pdf	45 KB	Adobe Acrobat Doc
oleacc.dll	32 KB	Application Extension
Speaker Information1.pdf	12 KB	Adobe Acrobat Doc
Speaker Information2.pdf	174 KB	Adobe Acrobat Doc
Thumbs.db	16 KB	Data Base File

A needle in the haystack



Torrents



Browser UI redressing

- IE9 on Windows 7
- Context: Local directory, network shared directory, WebDAV
- Explorer dir underneath a website
- Demo
- Also works in Chrome on Windows 7, but restricted to file download operations

Browser UI redressing (2)

- Chrome on Windows 7
- Context: remote
- Web server directory underneath a website
- Click-jacking game to silently download necessary files one-by-one
- Until all files are saved in %Downloads%
- Open exploit document

Set CD macro (MS Office)

- Context: local dir, network shared dir
- You can just execute arbitrary DLL from a macro
- But better to execute a kernel32!SetCurrentDirectory() API to fool forensic analysts
- Demo


MHT

- Single file in e-mail attachment
- Can contain any types of files, incl. binary
- Browser extracts files to %INET_TMP%
- Open exploit document by clicking <a href=".\files\document.txt"
- Exploit DLL will be executed from the same directory
- IE9 on Windows 7

Archives

- Any archives for Windows that extract all files by default? Not SFX of course
- WinRAR (latest): browse archive, doubleclick a HTML document only
 - Will extract ALL files into %TMP%
 - Including exploit DLL
 - Local browser context already

WinRAR FTW



Multistage

- Case: DLL triggered by manual file import, no registered extension handler – unexploitable?
- Stage 1: User gets an e-mail from admin (fake) instructing to install the attached reg-file (looks innocent)
- In two weeks, stage 2: user gets an e-mail from a friend with a RAR-ed html game
- Click-jacked open file -> exploit
- Or open file via network share
- As simple as the user is

So, what do we have?

- Some o-day vulnerabilities in up-to-date top platforms
 - Think of non-top software
- Ways to manipulate CD
- Ways to hide DLL
- Remote DLL Hijacking exploitation looks like normal client-side exploitation
- What else?

Conclusions

- Is this a good vector for mass attacks?
 - Authors of CVE-2011-1991, 1980, 2100 could tell us for sure
 - I say no
 - o-day exploits are not necessary for mass attacks anyway
- Excellent vector for rapid targeted/onsite attacks
 - Plenty of vulnerabilities everywhere
 - Easy 'n fast to find in arbitrary environment
 - Ease 'n fast to exploit (after this presentation ☺)
- Even the most trivial bug can be worked down to a good exploit

Questions?

Thanks to my team and interns

Thank you for attention

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